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Unemployment Insurance (UI) is one the nation’s most effective anti-poverty and eco-
nomic stabilization measures. Unfortunately, the number of workers receiving benefits has
substantially declined in recent decades. This Note probes one likely cause of this phenome-
non that scholars have mostly ignored: the rise of non-standard employment, including
part-time, temporary, contract, on-call, and independent contract work. Like many New
Deal programs, UI was designed to aid individuals with long-term, full-time jobs. It is
therefore poorly adapted to a non-standard workforce characterized by low wages, uncer-
tain schedules, and short-lived assignments. Indeed, the analysis shows that UI’s monetary
eligibility criteria, non-monetary eligibility requirements, outreach mechanisms, and ex-
clusions all disadvantage non-standard workers. The Note proposes reforms in each of these
areas to combat this imbalance.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year, millions of Americans rely on Unemployment Insurance
(UI) to make ends meet.1 The federal-state UI program provides up to
twenty-six weeks of income support to individuals who become unem-
ployed.2 To qualify, a worker must lose a job through no fault of her own
and satisfy her state’s eligibility requirements.3 UI is one of the government’s
most effective means of reducing poverty4 and stabilizing the economy.5
During the Great Recession, the program offered vital assistance to over
seventy million people.6
Unfortunately, in the last several decades, the share of workers eligible
for UI has plummeted.7 The proportion of unemployed persons receiving
benefits regularly exceeded 50% in the 1950s.8 Since then, however, it has
1 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OUTLOOK: PRESIDENT’S
BUDGET FY 2019, at 10 (2018), https://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/
prez_budget_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/98YK-J5T2].
2 JULIE M. WHITTAKER & KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33362,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: PROGRAMS AND BENEFITS 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL33362.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6H2-LD9M].
3 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (2018), https:/
/workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp [https://perma.cc/MB84-2E94].
4 See THOMAS GABE & JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41777, AN-
TIPOVERTY EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 24–25 (2013) (using the official fed-
eral poverty line as a baseline), https://greenbook-waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.
waysandmeans.house.gov/files/R41777_gb.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRV9-S6ML].
5 See Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, The Economic Case for
Strengthening Unemployment Insurance, Remarks at the Center for American Progress 5
(July 11, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160711_
furman_uireform_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WAK-JPHZ].
6 Id. at 1.
7 See WILL KIMBALL & RICK MCHUGH, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO.
392, HOW LOW CAN WE GO? STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS EXCLUDE
RECORD NUMBER OF JOBLESS WORKERS 5 (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/
how-low-can-we-go-state-unemployment-r3.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX66-886Y].
8 Catherine Sauviat, The Unemployment Benefit System: A Degree of Minimal Protection, for
‘Insiders’ Only, in UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
311, 316 (Florence Lefresne ed., 2010).
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fallen to a record low of around 23%.9 In thirteen states—including some of
the most populous, such as Florida and North Carolina—fewer than 20% of
jobless individuals now receive benefits.10 This decline has put the well-being
of millions of families11 and the economy12 at risk.
While scholars have debated the causes of this trend,13 at least one ex-
planation remains underexplored: the rise of non-standard forms of employ-
ment. UI was founded in an era when full-time manufacturing jobs were the
norm.14 Yet today, part-time work, temporary work, contract work, on-call
work, and independent contracting are all fast-growing.15 The changing na-
ture of employment raises the prospect that UI is poorly matched to new
markets. This problem is especially important given that disproportionate
numbers of non-standard workers are from marginalized groups, such as wo-
men and people of color.16 This Note therefore seeks to answer two ques-
tions: (1) how well does UI serve non-standard workers and (2) what can
policymakers do to improve it?
The analysis shows that UI disadvantages non-standard workers along
four dimensions. First, UI’s monetary eligibility requirements fail to reflect
non-standard workers’ low wages and intermittent assignments.17 Second,
UI’s non-monetary requirements shut out individuals who leave jobs for
compelling personal reasons, unfairly penalize part-time workers who cannot
search for full-time employment, and trap temporary workers in a cycle of
poorly-paid gigs.18 Third, UI information schemes do not account for non-
standard workers’ low education levels and difficulty determining program
eligibility.19 Fourth, UI unnecessarily excludes independent contractors.20
9 KIMBALL & MCHUGH, supra note 7, at 5.
10 RACHEL WEST ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOY-
MENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA 39 (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Report-
Strengthening-Unemployment-Protections-in-America.pdf [https://perma.cc/N362-YGGS].
11 GABE & WHITTAKER, supra note 4, at 1.
12 JOSH BIVENS, ECON. POLICY INST., INEQUALITY IS SLOWING US ECONOMIC
GROWTH 1 (2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/136654.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E66-MJ5Y].
13 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERI-
CAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 77–78 (1999).
14 Jeffrey Wenger, Improving Low-Income Workers’ Access to Unemployment Insurance, in
WHAT WORKS FOR WORKERS?: PUBLIC POLICIES AND INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
LOW-WAGE WORKERS 247, 248–49 (Stephanie Luce et al. eds., 2014).
15 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT
WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 12 (2015), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/670/669766.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2HQ-NHJ8]; Lawrence F. Katz &
Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United
States, 1995–2015, at 7 (Apr. 25, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.sole-jole.org/
16KK.pdf [https://perma.cc/39FN-Z5RT].
16 WEST ET AL., supra note 10, at 42; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note
15, at 67 (author’s own calculations); OFFICE OF EMP’T AND UNEMP’T STATISTICS, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1005, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND
ETHNICITY, 2007, at 12 (2008), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/archive/
race_ethnicity_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K4D-D7UP].
17 See infra Section IV.A.
18 See infra Section IV.B.
19 See infra Section IV.C.
20 See infra Section IV.D.
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Fortunately, solutions to these problems exist. States could relax mone-
tary requirements by calculating the earnings needed to qualify for UI over
longer timespans, replacing earnings thresholds with work-hour minimums,
and eliminating benefit waiting periods.21 Furthermore, states could refine
non-monetary criteria by allowing part-time workers, people who leave jobs
for family reasons, and temps searching for full-time employment to obtain
benefits.22 States could also strengthen informational conduits by mounting
UI advertising campaigns, notifying laid-off workers about program eligibil-
ity, providing multiple benefit application methods, and expanding resources
for non-English speakers.23 Finally, lawmakers could increase independent
contractors’ income security by integrating them into the UI system and
combatting employee misclassification.24
The discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I explores UI’s design and
history. Part II traces the rise of non-standard employment since the 1970s.
Part III outlines the most prominent types of non-standard jobs. Part IV
examines the institutional mismatches between these new forms of work and
the UI program. Finally, Part V details the changes that could strengthen UI
going forward.
I. WHAT IS UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE?
The Unemployment Insurance program was created during the New
Deal to protect workers from the financial hardship of temporary job loss.25
In the decades since its inception, UI has become a critical anti-poverty and
macro-economic stabilization tool.26 Unfortunately, it has also fallen out of
step with changing markets and failed to cover an increasingly large swath of
America’s workforce.27
A. Program History and Background
The UI program was established in the wake of the Great Depression
by the Social Security Act of 1935.28 Between 1929 and 1933, the U.S. econ-
omy contracted by 40%.29 Unemployment rose to 25%, plunging millions of
families into poverty.30 This desperation convinced lawmakers of the need to
protect workers against future shocks.31 The program they created advanced
21 See infra Section V.A.
22 See infra Section V.B.
23 See infra Section V.C.
24 See infra Section V.D.
25 See infra Section I.A.
26 See infra Section I.B.
27 See infra Section I.C.
28 GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 13, at 73.
29 THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., SOCIAL INSURANCE: AMERICA’S NEGLECTED HER-
ITAGE AND CONTESTED FUTURE 49 (2013).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 52–55.
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two goals: to temporarily replace a share of earnings for workers who lost
jobs through no fault of their own, and to steady the economy by raising
aggregate demand for goods and services.32
The UI program is a state-federal partnership. It is funded by both
federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and state payroll
taxes under state unemployment tax acts.33 It is therefore best described as a
collection of fifty state-administered programs subject to federal oversight.34
States determine the key features of their systems, including eligibility con-
ditions, benefit levels and duration, and employer tax rates and exemptions.35
Though federal guidelines mandate a set of minimum criteria,36 states’ dif-
fering appetites for social spending lead to varying program generosity across
the country.37
UI remains one of the pillars of the American welfare system. In 2015,
state governments collected more than forty-two billion dollars in unem-
ployment taxes and disbursed close to thirty-two billion dollars in regular
benefits.38 The excess revenue went toward rebuilding states’ UI trust funds,
which were badly depleted during the Great Recession.39 The UI program
covered a total of 135.9 million jobs in 2015.40 Although only 2.6 million
workers received benefits that year,41 UI provides a safety net for a much
larger group; during the Great Recession, more than seventy million Ameri-
cans—including seventeen million children—were supported by UI
extensions.42
B. UI’s Economic and Anti-Poverty Effects
UI largely fulfills its economic stabilization and anti-poverty objectives.
Jason Furman, former Chairman of President Obama’s Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, has highlighted four major economic benefits of UI.43 First,
it provides households with much-needed income when a breadwinner loses
his or her job; absent UI, a typical family whose head of household becomes
unemployed would spend about 15% less on food.44 Second, by providing
households with income replacement, UI limits the depth of economic re-
32 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-291, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE:
INFORMATION ON BENEFIT RECEIPT 13 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245685.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4RA-ZCYV].
33 WHITTAKER & ISAACS, supra note 2, at 1.
34 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 14.
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 H. Luke Schaefer, Identifying Key Barriers to Unemployment Insurance for Disadvantaged
Workers in the United States, 39 J. SOC. POL. 439, 440 (2010).
38 See WHITTAKER & ISAACS, supra note 2, at 12.
39 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 1, at 4.
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id.
42 Furman, supra note 5, at 1.
43 Id. at 5–6.
44 Id. at 5.
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cessions.45 Third, UI strengthens labor markets by including job-search re-
quirements that incentivize workers not to drop out of the labor force.46
Fourth, UI improves the functioning of labor markets by providing workers
with enough temporary income to find jobs well-matched to their skills.47
The UI program significantly reduces poverty, particularly during reces-
sions. As the Congressional Research Service has shown, 26.5% of unem-
ployed persons who received UI benefits in 2011 would have been
considered poor before accounting for the program.48 Their poverty rate fell
to just 13.8% as a result of the benefits.49 These positive effects extend to
beneficiaries’ dependents.50 While 10.2 million individuals received UI pay-
ments in 2011, another 15.8 million of their family members benefited indi-
rectly from the support.51 The poverty rate for people in families who
received UI benefits was nearly 40% lower than it would have been without
the program (Figure 1).52 Altogether, UI lifted 2.3 million Americans out of
poverty in 2011, including 620,000 children.53
FIGURE 1: PRE- AND POST-UI BENEFIT POVERTY RATES OF PERSONS
IN FAMILIES THAT RECEIVED UI BENEFITS
Source:
GABE & WHITTAKER, supra note 4, at 18.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 5–6.
47 Id. at 6.
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C. Declining Recipiency Rates and Institutional Mismatches
Unfortunately, as the UI program has matured, it has also left an in-
creasing number of workers behind. The national UI recipiency rate, which
represents the share of unemployed persons receiving benefits, has declined
significantly over the past several decades (Figure 2).54 The recipiency rate
regularly surpassed 50% in the 1950s.55 By December 2014, it fell to a near-
record low of just 23.1%.56 Recipiency rates vary by state.57 In 2015, they
ranged from 10.9% in Florida to 70% in North Dakota.58 In 13 states, how-
ever, fewer than one in five unemployed workers received UI benefits that
year (Figure 3).59
FIGURE 2: UI RECIPIENCY RATE, 1977–2014
Source:
KIMBALL & MCHUGH, supra note 7, at 5.
54 KIMBALL & MCHUGH, supra note 7, at 5.
55 Sauviat, supra note 8, at 316.
56 KIMBALL & MCHUGH, supra note 7, at 1.
57 While rate variations are likely a function of states’ differing worker outreach policies,
UI eligibility conditions, and claimant population characteristics, their exact sources remain
understudied. See WEST ET AL., supra note 10, at 63–64.
58 Id. at 40.
59 Id.
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FIGURE 3: SHARE OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS WHO RECEIVED
UI IN 2015






















































WEST ET AL., supra note 10, at 40.
Scholars continue to debate the causes of this long-term fall in UI par-
ticipation. Four explanations have been most prominent.60 First, the
workforce has become younger, meaning that more workers are concentrated
in low-wage and insecure jobs that make it harder to qualify for UI.61 Sec-
ond, the labor force has become more female, further increasing the propor-
tion of workers in low-income and part-time positions, as women form an
outsized share of those labor segments.62 Third, stable, full-time manufac-
turing employment has significantly declined.63 Finally, many states’ eligibil-
ity policies have become more restrictive.64
60 GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 13, at 77–78.
61 Id. at 77.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 78.
64 Id.
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What the literature has thus far paid too little attention to is the com-
mon theme underlying these factors: that UI’s design may be poorly suited to
the rise of non-standard employment.65 As Furman has noted, perhaps no
challenge is as pressing as the “changing nature of the employment relation-
ship, and in particular the movement toward models of the employer-em-
ployee relationship that have shifted greater risk onto workers.”66 The poor
wages characteristic of these arrangements should indeed be cause for con-
cern: while low-income workers are two-and-a-half times more likely to be
unemployed than high-wage workers, they are about half as likely to receive
UI benefits.67 The following section therefore explores the changes that have
made labor markets more precarious.
II. THE RISE OF NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
Like many New Deal programs, UI was premised on a particular vision
of the American worker: heads of households employed full-time in a trade
or the manufacturing sector.68 Since the 1970s, globalization, technological
advances, and new management practices have encouraged firms to abandon
the standard contract for more precarious arrangements.69 Studies reveal that
non-standard employment relationships have predominated among jobs cre-
ated after the Great Recession.70
A. The Old Paradigm: The “Standard Employment Contract”
When lawmakers created UI in 1935, they tailored the program to fit
the labor market of their time. Much of the workforce consisted of prime-
aged males who served as their families’ breadwinners.71 While not all of
them enjoyed stable employment, many worked full-time in manufacturing
or a unionized trade.72 A sizable majority received good pay.73 Even if they
65 Only one group of researchers has previously examined this question, with a special
focus on how other social programs could make up for UI’s shortcomings. See NANCY K.
CAUTHEN, ANNETTE CASE & SARAH WILHELM, PROMOTING SECURITY IN A 21ST CEN-
TURY LABOR MARKET (Sept. 2015), http://familyvaluesatwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
05/nonstandard_work_final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8DQ-YXVJ].
66 Furman, supra note 5, at 4.
67 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1147, LOW-WAGE AND PART-
TIME WORKERS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE LOW RATES OF RECEIPT 19 (2007), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/270/266500.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM77-KR57]. Unfortunately, the re-
port did not investigate the reasons for this discrepancy. The GAO merely hypothesized that
“[l]ow levels of UI receipt among low-wage workers may be explained by the circumstances
and preferences of low-wage workers coupled with UI eligibility rules, particularly the base
period for meeting the minimum earnings requirement for UI and reasons for separating from
work.” Id. at 3.
68 See infra Section II.A.
69 See infra Section II.B.
70 See infra Section II.C.
71 Wenger, supra note 14, at 248–49.
72 Id.
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were laid off during a recession, these workers could count on finding similar
jobs once the economy rebounded.74
This “standard employment contract” reflected employers’ desire to
build strong internal labor markets.75 Firms sought to minimize costs by en-
suring that the skilled workers they hired and trained stayed with them for
decades.76 In order to achieve this goal, they provided “an implicit promise of
long-term employment and of orderly and predictable patterns of promo-
tion.”77 Many companies also forged employee loyalty by offering generous
health and pension benefits.78 Labor unions, buoyed by laws that strength-
ened worker protections and collective bargaining, entrenched and expanded
these practices throughout the 1940s and 1950s.79
According to sociologists Arne Kalleberg and Peter Marsden, the stan-
dard employment relationship has four main characteristics.80 First, it in-
volves the exchange of employee labor for monetary compensation.81 Second,
it requires that workers perform duties according to a pre-set schedule at the
employer’s place of business.82 Third, it requires that workers follow detailed
directions and labor under the employer’s control.83 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, it features a shared expectation of long-term, full-time work.84
Standard employment relations lie at the foundation of not just the UI
system, but of many welfare institutions in the United States. American so-
cial policy’s continued reliance on employer-provided health and pension
plans is a holdover from an era in which the standard contract was domi-
nant.85 National employment and labor laws also continue to take traditional
job structures as their point of departure.86 Over the past several decades,
however, socio-economic shifts have placed a major strain on the standard
model and the welfare constructs that depend upon it.
73 See Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Tran-
sition, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
74 See Sauviat, supra note 8, at 319–20.
75 Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization, Globalization, and Privatization: Three Chal-
lenges to Labour Rights in Our Time, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 77, 79 (2006).
76 Id. at 80.
77 Id.
78 See Katherine V.W. Stone, The Decline of the Standard Contract of Employment in the
United States: A Socio-Regulatory Perspective, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BE-
YOND THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 59, 59 (Katherine V.W. Stone &
Harry Arthurs eds., 2013).
79 Id. at 64.
80 Arne L. Kalleberg & Peter V. Marsden, Transformation of the Employment Relationship,





85 See Kalleberg, supra note 73, at 16.
86 See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The Future of Labor and Employment Law in the
United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08–11, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1127885 [https://perma.cc/DUM7-
N97C].
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B. The Demise of Standard Employment Relationships
Since the mid-1970s, globalization has pushed firms to abandon the
standard contract.87 Heightened capital mobility, cheaper shipping, and the
internet have moved price competition to a global level, pressuring firms to
pay more attention to profitability and consumer preferences.88 These forces
have also allowed companies to reduce costs by splintering production across
multiple countries.89 Meanwhile, widespread mechanization has significantly
reduced corporations’ dependence on manual labor.90 All of these changes
have been encouraged by neoliberal politicians eager to loosen employment
regulations and promote transnational trade.91
In response to these forces, firms have sought to increase the flexibility
of their labor relations. The aforementioned “changes [have] made the fixed
costs and overhead obligations associated with the [standard contract] less
viable for employers, ushering in a new economic order fundamentally dis-
tinct from the bureaucratic model of work.”92 Companies have pursued the
“flexibility to hire and fire on short notice; to increase or shrink the overall
size of their workforce; to adjust pay to short-term performance results; to
redeploy workers within the firm and to outside production partners; and to
retain workers with particular skills on an as-needed basis.”93
The non-standard jobs firms have created to meet these goals differ
greatly from those they embraced during the New Deal. In general, non-
standard employment relationships are more transactional and less secure
than their predecessors.94 Some are mediated through third parties rather
than directly.95 Others dissolve the employer-employee distinction by forcing
workers to engage in significant self-management.96 Almost none provide a
guarantee of stable, long-term employment or adequate benefits.97
87 See Kalleberg, supra note 73, at 2–3; Kalleberg & Marsden, supra note 80, at 4; Kathe-
rine V.W. Stone, In the Shadow of Globalization: Changing Firm-Level Employment Practices
and Shifting Employment Risks in the United States, in GLOBALIZATION COMES HOME: HOW
THE UNITED STATES IS BEING TRANSFORMED BY GLOBALIZATION 2 (UCLA Sch. of Law,
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07–13, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1023696 [https://perma.cc/BW8J-A2Z8].
88 See e.g. Kalleberg & Marsden, supra note 80, at 4; Stone, supra note 87, at 2.
89 See Stone, supra note 75, at 85.
90 Mark Mauro, Manufacturing Jobs Aren’t Coming Back, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 18,
2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602869/manufacturing-jobs-arent-coming-back
[https://perma.cc/9P85-GT3F].
91 See Stone, supra note 75, at 89.
92 Kalleberg & Marsden, supra note 80, at 4.
93 Stone, supra note 87, at 2.
94 Kalleberg & Marsden, supra note 80, at 5.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 6.
97 See infra Part III.
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C. The Rise of Non-Standard Work
Non-standard relationships now account for a sizable number of jobs in
the United States. In 2015, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
estimated that non-standard, or “contingent,” work—which it defined to in-
clude agency temporary work, on-call work, contract company work, inde-
pendent contracting, self-employment, and standard part-time work—
represented approximately 40.4% of the nation’s employed labor force.98 The
analysis showed that the proportion of the labor force employed in non-
standard arrangements rose by 5.1% from just 2006 to 2010.99
Indeed, evidence suggests that non-standard employment relationships
make up a disproportionate share of the jobs created in recent years.100 In a
2016 study, economists Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger found that work-
ers in these arrangements—which they define to include temporary help
agency work, on-call work, contract work, and independent contracting (but
not part-time work)—climbed from 10.1% to 15.8% of the labor force be-
tween 2005 and 2015 (Figure 4).101 Most strikingly, their analysis revealed
“that all of the net employment growth in the U.S. economy from 2005 to 2015
. . . occurred in alternative work arrangements.”102 Better grasping these non-
standard employment relationships is therefore key to uncovering UI’s im-
pact on labor markets.
98 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 4.
99 Id.
100 See generally Katz & Krueger, supra note 15.
101 Id. at 2.
102 Id. at 7 (referencing Table 2 on page 27).
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FIGURE 4: NON-STANDARD WORK ARRANGEMENTS (EXCLUDING
PART-TIME WORK), 1995-2015
Source:
Katz & Krueger, supra note 15, at 7.
III. TYPES OF NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT
What forms does non-standard work take? Answering this question is
the first step to understanding how these jobs clash with UI’s design. In
effect, each type of non-standard employment holds the potential to raise
unique challenges to UI. Scholars continue to debate exactly what the label
“non-standard” comprises. Nonetheless, many agree that it includes at least
five arrangements: part-time work, temporary help agency work, contract
work, on-call work, and independent contracting.
A. Part-Time Work
Part-time work is by far the most common type of non-standard rela-
tionship.103 It is usually defined as work lasting fewer than thirty-five hours a
week.104 In 2010, part-time workers accounted for approximately 16.2% of
the employed labor force.105 This represents more than twenty-two million
103 See Arne L. Kalleberg, Nonstandard Employment Relations: Part-Time, Temporary and
Contract Work, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 341, 343 (2000).
104 See id.
105 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 12.
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Americans.106 Over six million of those workers would have preferred full-
time jobs if they could have obtained them.107 Their swelling ranks form the
main driver of an “underemployment” trend that has gripped the economy
since the Great Recession.108 Part-time workers are disproportionately fe-
male, as women are more likely to assume caregiving responsibilities along-
side employment.109 These workers also tend to have less education than
their standard, full-time counterparts.110 A 2007 GAO study found that un-
employed workers who were part-time at their last job were significantly less
likely to receive UI benefits than those who were full-time.111
B. Contract Work
Contract workers are another prominent part of the non-standard labor
force. These employees work for firms that provide services to other compa-
nies under contract.112 They are generally assigned to a single client and per-
form their duties at its place of business.113 However, the contractor
continues to supervise these workers throughout the assignment.114 Contract
workers are often brought in to perform specialized functions unavailable in-
house, to reduce a project’s costs, or to meet increased demand.115 Their ser-
vices are therefore generally short-lived.116 Contract workers are dispropor-
tionately African-American and Latino.117 They are on average less educated
106 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS (2018), https://
www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#emp [https://perma.cc/R7A6-C96W] (author’s own
calculation).
107 See LONNIE GOLDEN, ECON. POLICY INST., STILL FALLING SHORT ON HOURS AND
PAY: PART-TIME WORK BECOMING NEW NORMAL 1 (2016), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/
114028.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P92-BS5A].
108 See id. at 3, 11. As the report underlined, the “elevated level of involuntary part-time
working is no longer cyclical. . . . If the labor market in 2015 were completely back to its 2007
share then the number of involuntary part-time workers would have been 4.5 million rather
than . . . 6.4 million . . . .” Id. at 11.
109 WAYNE VROMAN, URBAN INST., LABOR MARKET CHANGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE BENEFIT AVAILABILITY 8 (1998), https://wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullText_
Documents/op_03-98.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG8P-T88W].
110 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 67.
111 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 67, at 33. Though it did not
closely investigate the question, the GAO speculated that “[l]ow levels of UI receipt among
part-time workers may be explained by many of the same factors that affect low-wage work-
ers,” i.e, their “circumstances and preferences . . . coupled with UI eligibility rules, particularly
the base period for meeting the minimum earnings requirement for UI and reasons for separat-
ing from work.” Id. at 3, 4.




116 See Michelle R. Snyder, Staffing Employment Essentially Unchanged in 2016, AM.
STAFFING ASSOC. (Mar. 14, 2017), https://americanstaffing.net/posts/2017/03/14/staffing-
employment-essentially-unchanged-2016 [https://perma.cc/5R5C-LT8J] (noting that for
“temporary and contract workers . . . [t]he average length of employment with a staffing com-
pany was 11.5 weeks in 2016, slightly longer than the tenure of 10.8 weeks in 2015”).
117 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 67; BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, supra note 16 (author’s own calculation). Comprehensive data on this question
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than standard, full-time workers.118 In 2015, they made up 3.1% of the em-
ployed labor force, which translates to over 4.5 million Americans.119
C. Temporary Help Agency Work
Like contract workers, temporary help agency workers perform services
for clients over a narrow period.120 However, these workers are usually leased
to other companies on an hourly basis rather than staffed to one project.121
Temporary help agencies “constitute a modern-day ‘reserve labor army’ that
helps employers [to avoid] over-staffing positions with expensive full-time,
permanent workers who may not be utilized. By using temporaries, employ-
ers can staff minimally and then add temporary employees on an as-needed
basis.”122
In 2015, temporary help agency workers represented 1.6% of the em-
ployed labor force, or nearly 2.5 million Americans.123 Employers have no
obligation to provide temporary help agency workers with pay similar to that
enjoyed by full-time staff.124 These workers experience turnover rates two to
three times higher than those of permanent employees.125 Like part-time and
contract workers, temps tend to be less educated than individuals in stan-
dard, full-time positions.126 They are also disproportionately Latino and Af-
rican American.127
remain elusive. However, because this is such an important dimension of the rise of non-
standard work, the author calculated this statistic using the best available numbers. He did so
by comparing the percentage of workers of each race in the various categories of non-standard
employment (as listed in the GAO’s report on the contingent workforce, which provides 2005
figures) with the percentage of employed workers of each race in the overall labor force (as
noted in the BLS’s report on labor force characteristics by race and ethnicity, which provides
2007 figures—the earliest available and the closest to the GAO’s 2005 data). While African
Americans and Latinos respectively made up 11% and 14% of the total employed labor force in
2007, they accounted for 14.9% and 16.4% of contract company workers in 2005.
118 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 67.
119 See Katz & Krueger, supra note 15, at 27. See also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
supra note 106 (author’s own calculation).
120 Kalleberg, supra note 103, at 346–47.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 347.
123 See Katz & Krueger, supra note 15, at 27. See also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
supra note 106 (author’s own calculation).
124 See Kalleberg, supra note 103, at 350.
125 See VROMAN, supra note 109, at 21.
126 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 67.
127 See id. at 67; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 16, at 12 (author’s own
calculation using the method described supra, note 117). While African-Americans and Lati-
nos respectively made up 11% and 14% of the total employed labor force in 2007, they ac-
counted for 21.8% and 21% of agency temporary workers in 2005.
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D. On-Call Work and Day Labor
On-call workers are individuals called into work on an as-needed ba-
sis.128 Day laborers are a subset of on-call workers picked up by employers to
work for one day.129 These forms of employment are characterized by poverty
wages and a near-complete lack of job security.130 The majority of day labor-
ers are undocumented immigrants with limited rights.131 They are therefore
particularly vulnerable to wage theft and the vagaries of non-standard sched-
ules.132 Unsurprisingly, they are both less educated than standard full-time
workers on average133 and disproportionately Latino.134 In 2015, on-call
workers represented 2.6% of the employed labor force, or approximately four
million people.135
E. Independent Contracting
Independent contractors are self-employed workers.136 They range from
skilled engineers to workers in the so-called “gig economy,” who find jobs
through online platforms such as Uber and Task Rabbit.137 Independent
contractors have “neither an employer nor a wage contract and are responsi-
ble for their own tax arrangements.”138 However, many are closely directed
by their customers and have little control over their pay or work condi-
tions.139 Some analysts hence consider them “disguised wage laborers.”140 In
128 See PETER S. FISHER ET AL., IOWA POLICY PROJECT, NONSTANDARD JOBS, SUB-
STANDARD BENEFITS 5 (2005), http://www.cfcw.org/nonstandard.pdf. [https://perma.cc/
4QTV-83QK]
129 See id. at 4.
130 See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, ON-CALL WORK AND “ZERO HOURS” CONTRACTS 2
(2004), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/—-protrav/—-travail/docu
ments/publication/wcms_170714.pdf [https://perma.cc/86M4-T99J]; ABEL VALENZUELA JR.
ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES ii (2006), http://www.cosh
network.org/sites/default/files/Day%20Labor%20study%202006.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CJS-
L2L8].
131 See VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., supra note 130, at iii.
132 See id. at ii–iii.
133 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 67–68.
134 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 67 (author’s own calcula-
tions); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 16 (author’s own calculation using the
method described supra, note 117). While Latinos made up 14% of the total employed labor
force in 2007, they accounted for 19% of on-call workers in 2005.
135 See Katz & Krueger, supra note 15, at 27; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note
105 (author’s own calculation).
136 See Kalleberg, supra note 103, at 355.
137 See KATHERINE LUCAS MCKAY, EXPANDING PROSPERITY IMPACT COLLABORA-
TIVE, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, REFORMING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TO SUPPORT IN-
COME STABILITY AND FINANCIAL SECURITY 5 (2017), http://www.aspenepic.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/ASPEN_EPIC_UNEMPLOYMENT_INSURANCE_02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3FJ-LVHA].
138 Kalleberg, supra note 103, at 355.
139 See id.
140 Helen Rainbird, The Self-Employed: Small Entrepreneurs or Disguised Wage Laborers?, in
FAREWELL TO FLEXIBILITY, 201 (Anna Pollert ed., 1991).
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2015, independent contractors were the second-largest group of non-stan-
dard workers in the United States, encompassing a full 8.4% of the employed
labor force, or thirteen million Americans.141
Because a firm that enlists these workers is usually not liable for their
actions142 and can offload fringe benefit costs and taxes,143 companies have
strong incentives to misclassify employees as independent contractors.144 The
National Employment Law Project has estimated that as many as 30% of
employers misclassify employees to trim their balance sheets.145 This means
that several million workers who should benefit from stable employment in-
stead find themselves in non-standard arrangements with few protections.146
Even those who are properly classified face challenges. While a signifi-
cant number of independent contractors are satisfied with their work, many
suffer financial hardship.147 A 2016 McKinsey Global Institute report esti-
mated that over a quarter of independent contractors did their jobs out of
financial necessity and would have preferred traditional employment.148 The
study further showed that low-income individuals make up over a fifth of the
independent workforce.149 Participants in the expanding “gig economy” ap-
pear especially vulnerable.150 As the National Employment Law Project has
underscored, many “are striving to make a living by stringing together short-
term and poorly-paid . . . ‘tasks’ that offer little chance of a stable in-
come. . . . Both researchers and individual workers . . . have reported wages
at a poverty level . . . .”151
F. Summary
In short, standard and non-standard employment relations exhibit both
powerful commonalities and important differences. Most non-standard jobs
141 Katz & Krueger, supra note 15, at 27; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 106
(author’s own calculation).
142 See Kalleberg, supra note 103, at 356.
143 FRANÇOIS CARRÉ, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 403, (IN)DEPEN-
DENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION 4 (2015), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/87595.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X84K-625D].
144 Id.
145 NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION




147 JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., INDEPENDENT WORK:
CHOICE, NECESSITY, AND THE GIG ECONOMY 6–9 (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/
global-themes/employment-and-growth/independent-work-choice-necessity-and-the-gig-
economy [https://perma.cc/YX9X-VVM6].
148 Id. at 8–9.
149 Id. at 6.
150 REBECCA SMITH & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, RIGHTS ON
DEMAND: ENSURING WORKPLACE STANDARDS AND WORKER SAFETY IN THE ON-DE-
MAND ECONOMY 5 (2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Rights-On-Demand-Re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9JR-SH7W].
151 Id.
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tend to be less secure and more poorly remunerated than full-time employ-
ment. Aside from independent contracting, they disproportionately comprise
less-educated Americans152 and already-marginalized populations: women
fill a large majority of part-time roles, while Blacks and Latinos make up an
outsized share of contract, temporary, and on-call workers.153
However, the exact nature of the insecurities that workers confront in
each arrangement varies. Individuals in stable part-time positions who wish
to access full-time jobs do not face the same challenges as day laborers who
may not be called back to work in twenty-four hours. Making sense of how
these forms of work clash with UI requires a close look at how they interact
with the program’s design.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL MISMATCHES BETWEEN UI AND NON-STANDARD
EMPLOYMENT
An analysis of UI’s structure reveals that several of its features stand at
odds with non-standard employment. The incongruities that marginalize
non-standard workers fall into four categories: (1) overly restrictive monetary
eligibility requirements;154 (2) outdated non-monetary eligibility require-
ments;155 (3) unnecessary barriers to information;156 and (4) aggressive inde-
pendent contractor exclusions.157
A. Overly Restrictive Monetary Eligibility Requirements
1. Current Program Design. — To qualify for UI, workers must begin
by satisfying a series of monetary requirements. First, individuals must have
a history of work in the months before their application for compensation.158
This “base period” is the “time period during which wages earned and/or
hours/weeks worked are examined to determine an individual’s monetary en-
titlement to benefits.”159 Nearly all states use the first four of the last five
calendar quarters as a base period to determine an individual’s monetary en-
titlement.160 For individuals who do not qualify under the regular base pe-
riod, certain states employ an alternative base period (ABP) consisting of the
152 See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 67–68.
153 See supra notes 117, 127, and 134.
154 See infra Section IV.A.
155 See infra Section IV.B.
156 See infra Section IV.C.
157 See infra Section IV.D. Cauthen and her co-authors have similarly highlighted that
some of the main reasons the unemployed do not receive benefits are that they do not apply,
do not earn enough during the statutory eligibility period, and do not have a reason for job
separation that fulfills allowable criteria. See Cauthen Case & Wilhelm, supra note 65, at
17–19.
158 See EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2016 COMPARISON OF
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last four completed calendar quarters of employment.161 A handful of states
also rely on an extended base period (EBP) for people who do not earn
wages in the regular base period due to injury or illness.162
Second, workers must prove that they earned a minimum amount of
wages or worked a minimum amount of time (or both) over the course of the
base period.163 States generally calculate qualifying wages or employment us-
ing one of four methods: by requiring workers to have earned an amount
equal to or greater than a specified multiple of the individual’s weekly bene-
fits during the base period; by requiring workers to have earned a particular
dollar amount of total wages during the base period; by requiring workers to
have labored a certain number of weeks at a particular wage; or by requiring
workers to have earned a certain dollar amount in the quarter with the high-
est earnings of their base period.164 Many states use some variation of the last
approach, known as the “high-quarter” method.165 In 2016, the minimum
high-quarter wages needed to qualify for UI ranged from a low of $728 in
South Dakota to a high of $3162 in Michigan.166
Third, if a worker turns out to be eligible for benefits, she must undergo
a waiting period before collecting payments.167 The vast majority of states
require a one-week waiting period.168 In most states, this period is the same
regardless of whether an individual seeks full or partial unemployment
benefits.169
2. Shortfalls for Non-Standard Workers. — UI’s monetary requirements
disadvantage non-standard workers in multiple ways. The regular base pe-
riod that most states employ does not accurately reflect contract workers,
temporary workers, and on-call workers’ fractured calendars. Because these
laborers lack employment security and control over their workweeks, they
suffer frequent job interruptions. This makes it crucial that every day they
work be counted toward their UI eligibility. Yet, as the Department of La-
bor highlights, relying on the first four of the last five completed calendar
quarters before a claim filing produces “a lag of up to 6 months between the
end of the base period and the date an individual becomes unemployed . . . .
As a result, the individual’s most recent work history is not used when mak-
ing an eligibility determination.”170
Though many states have recently adopted an ABP composed of the
last four calendar quarters of employment, twelve have not.171 As of March
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 3-4.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 3-9.
166 Id. at 3-5–3-6.
167 See id. at 3-14.
168 See id. at 3-16.
169 See id. at 3-14.
170 Id. at 3-2.
171 See ANNALISA MASTRI ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, STATES’ DECI-
SIONS TO ADOPT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICAN RE-
COVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 8–9 (2016), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/
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2018, these states––which include some of the largest in the union, such as
Florida, Pennsylvania, and Texas––were together home to over forty-eight
million workers, or approximately one-third of the civilian labor force.172 In
its current form, the ABP also fails to adequately cover the most precarious
individuals, who simply cannot accumulate four calendar quarters of employ-
ment before needing benefits.
The earning thresholds that UI establishes prejudice nearly all types of
non-standard workers.173 Whether they serve as part-time employees, tem-
porary staff, or day laborers, non-standard workers generally earn less per
hour and in the aggregate than their full-time counterparts.174 This means
that they must “work more hours than higher-income workers to qualify for
UI.”175 Even when they put in a high number of hours, those in the most
insecure non-standard arrangements, like on-call work, risk earning too little
to meet their states’ minimum requirements.176
Forcing eligible persons to wait one week before receiving UI benefits
also disproportionately impacts non-standard workers. Many of these indi-
viduals live paycheck-to-paycheck and have little or no savings to rely on in
the event of unemployment.177 Given the frequency and suddenness with
which temporary, contract, and on-call workers can find themselves out of a
job, the weight of a week without pay falls especially heavily on these groups
and their families.
B. Outdated Non-Monetary Eligibility Requirements
1. Current Program Design. — Non-monetary eligibility rules also
present a significant hurdle.178 Here again, workers must qualify for UI along
several dimensions. First, individuals must prove that they lost their job
through no fault of their own.179 Specifically, a worker may only obtain bene-
completed-studies/UCP_State_Decisions_to_Adopt.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FVF-J3SP]. The
full list of states that have yet to adopt an ABP is: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming.
Id. at 39 tbl.V.1.
172 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY
STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA (June 27, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
metro.t01.htm [https://perma.cc/9U68-W7ZU].
173 Cauthen and her collaborators have similarly emphasized this point, noting that un-
realistic earnings thresholds plague low-wage workers of all types. Cauthen Case & Wilhelm,
supra note 65, at 18.
174 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 5–6.
175 WEST ET AL., supra note 10, at 41.
176 See id. at 41.
177 See Katz & Krueger, supra note 15, at 24 (finding that “workers in alternative work
arrangements earn considerably less per week than do regular employees with similar charac-
teristics and in similar occupations”); see also Gabriella Chiarenza, Economics in the Commu-
nity Context: Underemployment 23–30 (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, July 2016),
https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/economics-in-the-community-context-
underemployment.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N9X-WXHF].
178 See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 37, at 439 (finding that non-monetary eligibility criteria
may depress UI recipiency rates even more than monetary requirements).
179 See EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 158, at 5-1.
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fits after quitting her job on the rare occasion she can point to “good
cause.”180 As the Department of Labor has underlined, “[i]n many states,
good cause is explicitly restricted to good cause connected with the work, at-
tributable to the employer, or involving fault on the part of the employer.”181
The most common reasons states accept as “good cause” are compulsory re-
tirement, sexual harassment, and service in the armed forces.182
Second, workers must show that they are “available for work.”183 This
generally means
being ready, willing, and able to work. . . . Nonavailability may be
evidenced by substantial restrictions upon the kind or conditions of
otherwise suitable work that an individual can or will accept, or by
the refusal of a referral to suitable work made by the employment
service, or of an offer of suitable work made by an employer.184
Importantly, half of the states require individuals to be available for full-time
work, regardless of whether they would prefer a part-time position.185
Third, UI claimants must prove that they are “actively seeking” employ-
ment.186 All states require UI applicants to register for work at their local
employment office.187 Most also track the number of employers an individual
applies to while receiving benefits and mandate a minimum weekly number
of contacts, ranging from a low of one in Kansas to a high of five in Ore-
gon.188 Evidence suggests that states have enforced these provisions more
strictly in recent years.189 However, under federal law, states may not deny
UI benefits to any person in an approved training program.190 All states thus
exempt trainees from active work search requirements.191 Most states also
“allow a work search exemption if a separation is classified as a temporary
lay-off and there is a reasonable expectation that the worker will return to
work soon.”192
2. Shortfalls for Non-Standard Workers. — The narrow scope of most
states’ “good cause” provisions excessively burdens non-standard workers. In-
dividuals in part-time, temporary, contract, and on-call positions generally
180 Id. at 5-2.
181 Id. (emphasis added).
182 See id. at 5-2–5-5.
183 Id. at 5-25.
184 Id.
185 See MASTRI ET AL., supra note 171, at 6–9.
186 See EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 158, at 5-29.
187 See id.
188 See id. at 5-29–5-31.
189 GEORGE WENTWORTH, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, CLOSING DOORS ON THE
UNEMPLOYED: WHY MOST JOBLESS WORKERS ARE NOT RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT IN-
SURANCE AND WHAT STATES CAN DO ABOUT IT 11 (2017), http://www.nelp.org/content/
uploads/Closing-Doors-on-the-Unemployed12_19_17-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W6Z-
JUEL].
190 See EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 158, at 5-29.
191 See id.
192 Id.
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receive fewer employer-provided protections, including health benefits.193
Low wages also prevent them from affording employment support services
such as childcare.194 When illness or personal tragedy strikes, these workers
have little choice but to take time off. Yet most states do not consider volun-
tarily leaving a job to care for oneself or a family member “good cause.”195 As
the National Employment Law Project has pointed out, these restrictions
disproportionately harm people of color and women.196 These barriers are
starkly apparent in UI recipiency statistics: while 62% of job losers received
unemployment compensation in 2010, only 28% of job leavers did.197
Non-monetary criteria generate other challenges for non-standard
workers. The requirement that individuals be “available for work” has a par-
ticularly harsh impact on part-timers. Twenty-five states disallow part-time
workers from obtaining UI benefits by requiring them to search for full-time
work.198 Once again, this problem has an outsized effect on women; as many
are the primary caregivers in their families, they find themselves forced to
limit time at work to look after children and relatives.199
The work availability requirement presents further difficulties for tem-
porary workers. Thirty-two states’ laws provide that “if an employee of a
temporary service employer fails to be available for future assignments upon
completion of the current assignment, such individual shall be deemed to
have voluntarily left employment without good cause connected to the
work.”200 This obligation prevents temps from relying on UI for short-term
income while searching for more stable employment.201 As the Center for
American Progress has stressed, current policy effectively “trap[s] workers in
a repeated cycle of short-lived, dead-end jobs.”202
193 See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1.
194 See id. at 23.
195 See EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 158, at 5-2–5-9.
196 See WEST ET AL., supra note 10, at 41–42. Cauthen and her co-authors have also
stressed this gap, noting that “[s]ingle mothers, African American and young workers are more
likely to become jobless for health or family reasons . . . and are thus more likely to be disad-
vantaged by state rules that narrowly define good cause.” Cauthen Case & Wilhelm, supra note
65, at 19.
197 MARÍA ENCHAUTEGUI, URBAN INST., DISADVANTAGED WORKERS AND THE UN-
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM 4–5 (2012), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
alfresco/publication-pdfs/412620-Disadvantaged-Workers-and-the-Unemployment-Insur
ance-Program.PDF [https://perma.cc/9G5W-KTYK].
198 See MASTRI ET AL., supra note 171, at 8–9 tbl I.1).
199 See WEST ET AL., supra note 10, at 42.
200 EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 158, at 5–10 (empha-
sis added).
201 By the very nature of their jobs, temporary workers are also particularly likely to “face
interrupted employment and . . . have insufficient earnings or ‘inconsistent’ work histories” that
make it difficult for them to meet earning thresholds. Cauthen Case & Wilhelm, supra note
65, at 18.
202 RACHEL WEST ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHERE STATES ARE AND
WHERE THEY SHOULD BE ON UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS 6 (2016), https://cdn.ameri-
canprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/07060320/StateUI-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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C. Unnecessary Barriers to Information
Institutions designed to inform workers about UI also fail individuals in
non-standard arrangements. Surprisingly, one of the most important reasons
workers do not receive unemployment compensation is that they never apply
in the first place.203 A 2005 Urban Institute survey found that 52% of work-
ers who did not apply for UI refrained from doing so because “they believed
they were not eligible for benefits.”204 As the data showed, temporary work-
ers appeared particularly ill-informed about their ability to access the
program.205
Recent studies have suggested why non-standard workers are at greater
risk of foregoing the benefits they deserve. Less educated people who do not
apply for UI are more likely to falsely perceive themselves as ineligible for
not working or earning enough.206 As the findings in Part III indicated, such
individuals form a disproportionate share of the non-standard workforce.
Non-standard employment comprises a large percentage of the lowest-skill
positions in the economy; while just 7.7% of standard full-time workers sur-
veyed in 2010 had not completed high school, nearly 31% of core non-stan-
dard workers had not done so.207 Similarly, while 44.6% of standard full-time
workers had at least some college education in 2010, only 16.3% of core
non-standard workers did.208 Non-standard jobs are also structured in ways
that may deepen misperceptions about earnings and hours: many are low-
wage positions that feature minimal and variable schedules.209
At present, UI does little to ensure that non-standard workers know
which benefits they are entitled to. Few states require employers to alert
workers of their eligibility in a systematic way.210 No state appears to directly
reach out to separated workers.211 Because non-standard workers often have
203 Wayne Vroman, Unemployment Insurance Recipients and Nonrecipients in the CPS, 132
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 44, 49 (2009). See also Cauthen Case & Wilhelm, supra note 65, at 18
(stressing the same problem and noting that it stems partly from the fact that, while “[w]orkers
are often notified about UI benefits through a formal layoff process, . . . low-wage workers are
disproportionately employed in industries that tend to avoid formal layoffs”).
204 Vroman, supra note 203, at 49.
205 See id. at 49–50.
206 Alix Gould-Werth & H. Luke Schaefer, Unemployment Insurance Participation by Edu-
cation and by Race and Ethnicity, 135 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 28, 38 (2012).
207 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 17.
208 Id. at 17, 67–68.
209 See id. at 22, 27.
210 WEST ET AL., supra note 202, at 9 (highlighting only Massachusetts as an example of a
state that currently follows this practice).
211 See id. (recommending that states implement direct outreach to separated workers as a
policy innovation); Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Jeffrey B. Wenger, Taking Up Social Ben-
efits: A Cautionary Tale from An Unemployment Insurance Survey Experiment 10 (Sept. 14,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2341885 [https://perma.cc/767U-
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little attachment to their employers and cannot rely on them for informa-
tion, these institutional shortfalls likely hit them the hardest.212
D. Aggressive Independent Contractor Exclusions
Finally, independent contractors are completely excluded from UI. Be-
cause the program is financed through federal and state taxes levied on cov-
ered employers, independent contractors are not entitled to unemployment
compensation.213 Those with meager savings thus have few resources to fall
back on in the event of a financial shock. Moreover, large numbers of work-
ers who might otherwise qualify for UI are misclassified as independent con-
tractors.214 As noted earlier, as many as 30% of U.S. employers regularly
misclassify their workers to lower costs.215
E. Summary
In sum, UI’s existing design is poorly matched to the needs of a grow-
ing non-standard workforce. The program’s monetary eligibility require-
ments do little to account for non-standard workers’ low pay and fractured
schedules. UI’s non-monetary eligibility criteria ignore these individuals’
strenuous home lives and patterns of work. To make matters worse, many
non-standard workers who qualify for UI are not provided the information
needed to claim benefits. A good number are also denied support altogether
because employers misclassify them as independent contractors.
V. POTENTIAL REFORMS
UI’s shortfalls demand targeted reforms. While it is not possible to dis-
cuss all of the necessary changes here, the following proposals provide a
baseline on which policymakers can build. These suggestions track the four
broad categories of rules outlined above. A number have previously been
advanced in some form by the National Employment Law Project or the
Center for American Progress.216
A. Reforming Monetary Eligibility Requirements
Lawmakers should make several changes to UI’s monetary eligibility
requirements. First, all states should adopt the alternative base period (ABP)
to make it easier for workers with fissured work histories to qualify for bene-
212 See Vroman, supra note 203, at 45, 49–50 (showing that non-standard workers are
relatively less informed about UI eligibility than individuals in standard employment
relationships).
213 EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 158, at 1-1, 2-1.
214 See WEST ET AL., supra note 10, at 50–51.
215 NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 145.
216 See, e.g., WEST ET AL., supra note 10; WEST ET AL., supra note 202.
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fits. As noted above, twelve states—which together hold one-third of the
civilian labor force—have yet to adopt the ABP.217 Research suggests they
could significantly increase UI recipiency if they did. One Urban Institute
study concluded that the ABP expanded UI eligibility by 6 to 8% in the first
six states that enacted it.218 Regression analyses have found a positive and
statistically significant correlation between the ABP and UI eligibility
levels.219 Similarly, cross-state comparisons have revealed that states with
ABPs tend to have higher UI recipiency rates than states without them.220
Second, states should consider relaxing even the ABP to accommodate
workers with the most sporadic job calendars. The National Employment
Law Project has suggested extending the ABP from twelve to eighteen
months for the most precarious earners.221 This expanded ABP (or “ABP+”)
would account for the recurrent job interruptions that can befall non-stan-
dard workers.222 This would give them a better chance to aggregate infre-
quent paychecks to meet UI’s earnings requirements. To guard against abuse
of this new standard, states could limit the ABP+ to those groups most af-
flicted by work stoppages, such as contract workers, temporary help agency
workers, and on-call workers.223
Third, states should ultimately abandon earnings requirements and in-
stead consider the number of hours people work. Earnings thresholds are a
poor way of capturing job effort.224 As the National Employment Law Pro-
ject has observed, they can lead to absurd results: “in theory, a very high
earner could qualify for UI with only two hours of work . . . while a low
earner who worked just short of 13 weeks at the minimum wage would not
qualify.”225 Basing UI eligibility on work hours would restore equity between
these groups and give low earners the chance to claim vital benefits.226 Re-
formers would need to be careful not to set the hours minimum too high,
however; Canada’s move to a restrictive hours-based system actually contrib-
217 See MASTRI ET AL., supra note 171 (providing list of states that have not adopted
ABP); see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 172 (providing size of workforce in
those states).
218 WAYNE VROMAN, URBAN INST., UNEMP’T INS. OCCASIONAL PAPER 95-3, THE AL-
TERNATIVE BASE PERIOD IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: FINAL REPORT 2 (1995), https:/
/wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullText_Documents/op%5F03%2D95%2Epdf [https://perma.cc/
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219 WAYNE VROMAN, URBAN INST., LOW BENEFIT RECIPIENCY IN STATE UNEMPLOY-
MENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS 147 (2001), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publica
tion/61731/410383-Low-Benefit-Recipiency-in-State-Unemployment-Insurance-Programs.
PDF [https://perma.cc/DZR4-WHS4].
220 See id. at 158.
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average employment duration of 11.5 weeks at U.S. temporary staffing companies in 2016).
223 See infra Section III.B–D.
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uted to recipiency rate decreases.227 That country’s unemployment insurance
program continues to shut out many of its most vulnerable workers.228
Fourth, states should eliminate the one-week waiting period before
workers can obtain benefits. Waiting weeks are an artifact of history: they
“were originally adopted primarily because states required a delay at the start
of a new claim during which agencies processed UI claims manually . . . .”229
Today, waiting weeks serve only to disadvantage non-standard and low-
wage workers living paycheck-to-paycheck.
B. Reforming Non-Monetary Eligibility Requirements
Non-monetary criteria should also be altered. First, states should ex-
pand their definitions of “good cause” so that more workers who voluntarily
leave their jobs remain eligible for UI. States should at minimum allow indi-
viduals who quit jobs for compelling family reasons, such as caring for chil-
dren, to apply for unemployment compensation. An Urban Institute analysis
concluded that states with high UI recipiency rates also tended to allow
workers who quit for personal reasons—such as illness, care for a family
member, or domestic violence—to apply for benefits.230 By contrast, states
with low recipiency rates did not.231 Scholars have similarly found a positive
correlation between the presence of expansive “good cause” provisions and
the share of job leavers who qualify for UI.232
Second, states should allow workers who wish to search for a part-time
job to apply for benefits. As noted earlier, half of the states require the un-
employed to search for full-time work to be eligible for the program.233 Yet
part-time jobs are an increasingly large part of the labor market.234 As such,
they should be treated with the same respect as full-time positions. Policy-
227 See Mouna Viprey, Canada, From Unemployment Insurance to Employment Insurance:
The Disengagement of the State, in UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND
NORTH AMERICA: REFORMS AND CRISIS 325, 330 (Florence Lefresne ed., 2010).
228 See Andrew Jackson & Sylvain Schetagne, Canadian Centre for Policy Alts., Is EI
Working for Canada’s Unemployed? Analyzing the Great Recession, in ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL
BUDGET 2010 4, 6 (2010), https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publi-
cations/reports/docs/Is_EI_Working_For_Canadas_Unemployed.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SKL8-NUHL]. See generally Andrew Jackson, Why Canada Needs Progressive Reforms in Em-
ployment Insurance, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/re
port-on-business/rob-commentary/why-canada-needs-progressive-reforms-in-employment-
insurance/article36736240 [https://perma.cc/P6NP-QN8H].
229 RICK MCHUGH ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
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makers should also recognize that many people have no choice but to work
part-time because of caretaking duties.235
Combined with the ABP, these first two reforms could significantly
increase state UI recipiency rates. A study commissioned by the Department
of Labor estimated that UI first payments would have increased by 6 to 10%
in 2012 if all states had adopted these three policies after the Great
Recession.236
Third, states should stop requiring temps to remain available for tem-
porary jobs to maintain eligibility for benefits. This policy locks them into a
lifetime of insecure work that diminishes their opportunities for advance-
ment.237 By holding down millions of workers’ wages238—and thereby damp-
ening their demand for goods and services—this requirement also constrains
economic growth.239
C. Reforming Informational Institutions
Perhaps most importantly, states must strengthen institutions designed
to inform workers about UI eligibility, the process of obtaining benefits, and
programs that can facilitate their applications.240 This should at minimum
entail statewide advertising campaigns.241 To go further, lawmakers could
require employers to notify all workers about UI in a systematic way.242 They
could even provide firms with methods of filing initial claims on behalf of
separated employees.243 Alternatively, states could require employers to no-
tify the government of recent layoffs so that government can reach out to
workers directly.244 Such contacts would need to recur. As one study discov-
ered, laid-off workers generally “feel[ ] emotionally overwhelmed at the mo-
ment of job loss, which could make new information difficult to absorb.”245
235 See WEST ET AL., supra note 10, at 3. See also Cauthen Case & Wilhelm, supra note
65, at 20 (emphasizing that “in an era when employers increasingly require workers to be
available 24/7 with limited notice, requiring availability for full-time work denies UI benefits
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elderly parents or engaging in other socially-valued pursuits”).
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federal government to “[p]rovide fiscal incentives for states to implement comprehensive infor-
mation campaigns and enrollment assistance so that workers better understand their eligibility




244 See WEST ET AL., supra note 202, at 9.
245 Alix Gould-Werth, Workplace Experiences and Unemployment Insurance Claims: How
Personal Relationships and the Structure of Work Shape Access to Public Benefits, 90 SOC. SERV.
REV. 305, 339 (2016).
354 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 13
Notification would therefore likely need to be provided at least “twice: once
at the time of separation and again mailed to the home of the worker.”246
As states improve in this area, they must be mindful of the technologi-
cal and language barriers that confront many non-standard workers.247 States
have increasingly moved to online claim-filing systems. Yet studies have
shown that the low-income, less educated, and Latino workers who dispro-
portionately fill non-standard positions have less access to—and familiarity
with—the internet than the rest of the population.248 Many of these workers
also struggle with English. As such, online outreach and benefit applications
should be designed simply and in multiple languages.249 States should make
interpreters available to assist claimants who are not native English speak-
ers.250 Furthermore, states should provide “[a]t least one easily accessible al-
ternative means to online filing[, such as] telephone or in-person customer
assistance in the completion of an initial claim . . . .”251
Available data suggests that there may be a relationship between lan-
guage accommodation and recipiency.252 A 2001 study exploring variations
in states’ UI recipiency rates found that “high recipiency states all take claims
by telephone and . . . have much more client-friendly procedures for non-
English speakers,” including providing “brochures in several non-English
languages” and hiring telephone “staff fluent in the particular state’s most
common non-English languages.”253
Nevertheless, lawmakers must approach these tasks delicately. As recent
survey experiments have demonstrated, workers may have so much trouble
making sense of UI eligibility rules that they may apply in lower numbers if
given program specifics.254 At least one study has suggested that reducing
application barriers alone may be insufficient to increase UI participation.255
More research is needed to uncover which methods of conveying informa-
tion might prove most effective.
D. Addressing Independent Contractor Exclusions
Policymakers should strive to increase independent contractors’ eco-
nomic security. An important way they could do so is by devoting more
resources to combating employee misclassification.256 In concrete terms, this
246 Id.
247 See WENTWORTH, supra note 189, at 24.
248 See id. at 21.
249 See id. at 24.
250 See id.
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could mean guaranteeing that law enforcers scrutinize employers’ classifica-
tion decisions, target industries that commonly evade worker protections,
and establish task forces to combat specific abuses.257
Lawmakers should also try to find innovative solutions for workers who
are properly classified. As the Aspen Institute has noted, reformers have sev-
eral options at their disposal.258 They could follow a recommendation put
forth by the Center for American Progress and the National Employment
Law Project to create a “Jobseeker’s Allowance.”259 This short-term benefit
would assist jobseekers, including independent contractors, by providing
them with a weekly sum funded by general taxes.260 The allowance “would
offer a stipend of about $170 per week to jobseekers for up to 13 weeks,
replacing approximately 50% of the wages of a typical low-paid worker.”261
This modest benefit would likely “encourage workforce participation, sup-
port geographic labor mobility, and promote family stability and social
cohesion.”262
Similarly, lawmakers could encourage independent contractors to con-
tribute to unemployment savings accounts meant to buffer income gaps.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology “[e]conomist Jonathan Gruber pro-
poses that the government should fully fund security accounts—funded with
a 6% match on earnings—for all workers earning less than $25,000.”263
States could also permit independent contractors to pay into existing social
insurance schemes.264 California, for instance, already allows the self-em-
ployed to participate in its short-term disability and paid family leave pro-
grams.265 There is no reason states could not do the same in the context of
unemployment insurance.266
E. Moving Toward a Truly National UI System
Finally, it should be noted that these reforms would be more efficient
and easier to implement if UI were a truly national system. Many of the
program’s shortfalls––such as the lack of a nationwide alternative base pe-
riod––stem from the fact that states have vast power to shape their UI laws.
This makes little sense from an economic perspective. As Michael
Graetz and Jerry Mashaw have noted, “states cannot regulate interstate or
foreign commerce, modify the money supply, or control migration in or out
257 See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S
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of their jurisdictions. Yet all of these things bear importantly on the level of
economic risk experienced by their citizens.”267 Furthermore, “because eco-
nomic cycles have regional variations both in timing and intensity, it makes
sense to include the whole nation in the insurance pool.”268
A national system would also be politically preferable to the existing
patchwork quilt. UI improvements could be made in one fell swoop, rather
than on a state-by-state basis. Moreover, pro-reform coalitions could focus
their organizing efforts on one federal node instead of fifty statehouses.
As it turns out, the current system is largely the product of political
accident. The New Dealers who developed UI worried that Southern Dem-
ocrats would balk at giving so large a role to the federal government.269 Fur-
thermore, in a context where the Supreme Court expressed skepticism
toward President Roosevelt’s economic program, reformers were not certain
a fully nationalized system would pass constitutional muster.270 Graetz and
Mashaw have suggested that constitutional federalism no longer poses such a
threat.271 Whether they are correct depends on the program’s design and lies
beyond the scope of this analysis. Future studies should investigate this im-
portant question.
CONCLUSION
Since it was first enacted in 1935, Unemployment Insurance has played
a vital role in reducing worker poverty and stabilizing the economy. How-
ever, changing employment relations have increased pressure on a program
that initially catered to full-time manufacturing workers. The rise of part-
time work, temporary work, contract work, on-call work, and independent
contracting has challenged several of UI’s institutional pillars. The program’s
monetary and non-monetary eligibility rules fail to account for non-standard
workers’ sporadic job histories, low pay, and significant family duties. Fur-
thermore, states do too little to inform individuals of their eligibility for UI
and to combat employee misclassification. Benefit recipiency rates have al-
ready been falling for decades, leaving a growing number of Americans with-
out a basic income in the event of job loss. This situation will only worsen if
lawmakers do not take steps to adapt UI to contemporary labor markets.
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